Checklist · Agent Testing
Agent Testing Checklist
Verify an AI agent before it can act on real systems — tool scope, approval gates, caps, failure behaviour and the scenarios that expose goal hijacking. Free, editable Markdown.
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Agent: _______________ Version: _______ Date: _______
An agent that produces a wrong answer is a defect. An agent that takes a wrong action is an incident. This checklist assumes the second.
1. Before any testing#
- [ ] Goal stated precisely — what "finished" means
- [ ] Complete list of tools written down, with what each can do
- [ ] Every tool reviewed: is it as narrow as the task allows?
- [ ] No general-purpose tools (
run_query,execute,shell) - [ ] Permissions model recorded: whose permissions does it act with?
- [ ] Destructive, financial and outbound actions identified
- [ ] Step, time and spend caps set as hard limits
- [ ] Reversibility understood for every action it can take
2. Test environment#
- [ ] Tool doubles exist and are realistic — they fail like real systems
- [ ] Doubles can simulate timeout, error, rate limit, malformed response, partial success
- [ ] State resets cleanly between runs
- [ ] Full trajectory recorded: every decision, tool call, argument and result
- [ ] Inputs and tool responses seeded so variance is attributable
3. Core behaviour#
- [ ] Happy path run at least 5 times
- [ ] Completion rate recorded, not a single pass
- [ ] Step count recorded, with variance
- [ ] Cost per completed task recorded
- [ ] Chain length assessed against per-step reliability
🔴 95%-reliable steps chained 10 deep succeed ~60% of the time; 20 deep, ~36%. If the chain is long, shorten it or raise per-step reliability. There is no third option.
4. Failure behaviour#
- [ ] A tool fails — retries sensibly, tries another route, or reports. Does not give up silently
- [ ] Impossible task — stops and says so, does not manufacture a completion
- [ ] Ambiguous instruction — asks or states its assumption, does not guess silently
- [ ] Loop bait — a task with no achievable end. The step cap fires
- [ ] Interruption — leaves consistent state, no half-finished side effects
- [ ] Partial completion reported honestly, not as success
5. Security#
- [ ] Goal hijacking — hostile instructions inside retrieved content
- [ ] Tool misuse — a legitimate tool used for an unintended purpose
- [ ] Tool chaining — two harmless tools combined into something harmful (read-document + send-email is an exfiltration path)
- [ ] Memory poisoning — false information written into stored context, then a normal run
- [ ] Stored context can be inspected and cleared
- [ ] Permission boundary — run as a user who should not be able to act. Must refuse
- [ ] Out-of-scope tool attempts logged and counted as findings
- [ ] No single component holds both broad read and broad write access
6. Controls actually in the path#
- [ ] Human approval gate confirmed present for destructive actions
- [ ] Human approval gate confirmed present for outbound actions
- [ ] Approval cannot be bypassed by rephrasing the task
- [ ] Step cap verified by triggering it
- [ ] Spend cap verified by triggering it
- [ ] Every tool call logged with actor, arguments, result
7. Metrics to record#
| Measure | Value |
|---|---|
| Completion rate on real tasks | |
| Steps per task (median / max) | |
| Cost per completed task | |
| Refusal accuracy on impossible tasks | |
| Out-of-scope tool attempts | should be 0 |
| Approval gates triggered | confirms controls are live |
8. Before release#
- [ ] Runs in CI with faked tools and a fixed seed set
- [ ] Drop in completion rate treated as a build failure
- [ ] Rise in step count treated as a regression, even when the answer is right
- [ ] Re-tested after any model version change
- [ ] Re-tested after any tool added — this widens blast radius, not just behaviour
Sign-off#
| Name | Date | |
|---|---|---|
| Completed by | ||
| Reviewed by | ||
| Approved to act on production systems by |